We put forward a new paradigm for building hybrid encryption schemes from constrained chosen-ciphertext secure (CCCA) key-encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) plus authenticated symmetric encryption. Constrained chosen-ciphertext security is a new security notion for KEMs that we propose. CCCA has less demanding security requirements than standard chosen-ciphertext (CCA) security (since it requires the adversary to have a certain plaintextknowledge when making a decapsulation query) yet we can prove that CCCA is sufficient for secure hybrid encryption.
Introduction
One of the main fields of interest in cryptography is the design and analysis of encryption schemes in the public-key setting (PKE schemes) that are secure against a very strong type of attacks -indistinguishability against chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA 1 ) [30, 15] . In this work, we are interested in practical schemes with proofs of security under reasonable security assumptions (without relying on heuristics such as the random oracle model) and in general methods for constructing such schemes.
The first practical IND-CCA secure PKE scheme without random oracles was proposed in a seminal paper by Cramer and Shoup [12, 14] . Their construction was later generalized to hash proof systems [13] . In [36, 14] Cramer and Shoup also give a hybrid variant that encrypts messages of arbitrary length. The idea is to conceptually separate the key-encapsulation (KEM) part from the symmetric (DEM) part. Generally, this hybrid approach greatly improved
Our contributions
A new KEM/DEM composition theorem. We put forward the security notion of indistinguishability against Constrained chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCCA) for KEMs which is stronger than IND-CPA (CPA stands for chosen-plaintext attacks) yet strictly weaker than IND-CCA. Intuitively, CCCA is separated from CCA security by only allowing an adversary to make a decapsulation query if it has sufficient "implicit knowledge" about the plaintext key to be decapsulated (hence the name "Constrained chosen-ciphertext security"). 2 As our main technical contribution we formalize the above notion and prove a composition theorem that shows that any IND-CCCA secure KEM combined with any authenticated (symmetric) encryption scheme yields IND-CCA secure hybrid encryption. This gives a positive answer to the open question from [24] mentioned before. Authenticated encryption is a quite general symmetric primitive and examples include "encrypt-then-mac" schemes (based on computationally secure primitives), and also more efficient single-pass schemes (see, e.g., [31] ).
Constrained chosen-ciphertext secure KEMs formalize a new design paradigm for efficient hybrid encryption. To guarantee chosen-ciphertext security for hybrid encryption schemes it is sufficient to verify a natural security condition on the key encapsulation part. We assess the constructive appeal of this framework by demonstrating that the original Kurosawa-Desmedt scheme [24] , along with its variants [2, 29] and all hash-proof systems based schemes [13, 24] , can be thoroughly explained through it. We furthermore present a new IND-CCCA secure KEM from the DDH assumption and show how to build a class of practical KEMs from progressively weaker assumptions than DDH.
Constrained chosen-ciphertext secure KEM from DDH. We propose a new KEM which is IND-CCCA secure under the DDH assumption. Although it relies on different proof techniques (it is not based on hash proof systems), syntactically it is reminiscent to the one by Kurosawa and Desmedt and can in fact be viewed as its dual (in the sense that certain parts from the ciphertext and the symmetric key are swapped in our scheme). Even though it is not much more efficient than the scheme by Kurosawa and Desmedt, we still consider it to be interesting since it constitutes the first efficient DDH-based encryption scheme that is not based on hash proof systems.
Constrained chosen-ciphertext secure KEM from n-Linear. Building on [9, 21] we introduce a new class of purely algebraic intractability assumptions, the n-Linear assumptions, where n ≥ 1 is a parameter. They are such that the DDH assumption equals the 1-Linear assumption, the Linear assumption [9] equals the 2-Linear assumption, and the n-Linear assumptions become strictly weaker as the parameter n grows. More precisely, 1-Linear = DDH, and n-Linear implies n + 1-Linear, but (in the generic group model [35] ) n + 1-Linear is still hard relative to an n-Linear oracle. In fact, for n ≥ 2 the n-Linear assumption does not seem to be invalid in any obvious sense even in the groups from [19] , in which the DDH problem is easy, and the computational Diffie-Hellman problem is supposedly hard. We generalize the KD scheme and its dual to a class of parametrized KEMs and prove their IND-CCCA security assuming n-Linear. These appear to be the first practical encryption schemes in the literature from a purely algebraic assumption which is strictly weaker than DDH.
Computational Hash-Proof Systems. We propose a purely computational variant of hashproof systems. Generalizing [13, 24] , we prove that computational hash-proof systems directly imply IND-CCCA secure KEMs. Hence, in combination with authenticated encryption, they yield efficient IND-CCA secure hybrid encryption. The Kurosawa-Desmedt scheme fits this framework, i.e. the underlying HPS is computational. This gives the first full explanation of the Kurosawa-Desmedt scheme in terms of HPS. As a generalization we provide computational hash-proof systems from the n-Linear assumptions hence explaining IND-CCCA security of our class of KEMs from the n-Linear assumptions.
Discussion and related work
In [1] (which is the full version of [2] ), Abe et al. address the question from [24] about the existence of a natural weaker security condition for KEMs. They propose the notion of LCCA secure KEMs with respect to the predicate P mac and prove it sufficient to obtain, in combination with a MAC, IND-CCA secure tag-KEMs (and hence IND-CCA secure hybrid encryption). Though syntactically similar to ours, their notion mingles security of the KEM with the MAC part of the symmetric encryption scheme. The conceptual difference in our notion is that we give a general security definition for KEMs that is completely independent of any particular symmetric primitive. We think that this is more natural and more closely follows the spirit of the KEM/DEM approach [14] , where (for good reason) KEM and DEM are viewed as independent components.
Independent from this work Shacham [34] also proposes a family of hybrid encryption schemes from the n-Linear assumptions. His schemes can be viewed as a (slightly less efficient) CramerShoup variant of our schemes from Section 5.2.
The 2-Linear assumption was introduced by Boneh, Boyen, and Shacham [9] and was later used in gap-groups to build an IND-CCA secure KEM [22] . For n > 2, Kiltz [21] introduced the class of gap n-Linear assumptions and (generalizing [22] ) built a class of IND-CCA secure KEMs from it. Compared to n-Linear, in the latter gap-assumptions an adversary gets access to a DDH oracle which makes (for example) the gap 2-Linear assumption incomparable to DDH. In contrast, our motivation is to build schemes from an assumption weaker than DDH.
Preliminaries

Notation
If x is a string, then |x| denotes its length, while if S is a set then |S| denotes its size. If k ∈ N then 1 k denotes the string of k ones. If S is a set then s $ ← S denotes the operation of picking an element s of S uniformly at random. We write A(x, y, . . .) to indicate that A is an algorithm with inputs x, y, . . . and by z $ ← A(x, y, . . .) we denote the operation of running A with inputs (x, y, . . .) and letting z be the output. We write 
Public-Key Encryption
A triple PKE = (PKE.kg, PKE.Enc, PKE.Dec) is a public-key encryption (PKE) scheme, if PKE.kg and PKE.Enc are probabilistic PTA, and PKE.Dec is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm. For consistency, we require that for all k ∈ N, all messages M , it must hold that Pr[PKE.Dec(sk , PKE.Enc(pk , M )) = M ] is overwhelming in k, where the probability is taken over the above randomized algorithms and (pk , sk ) $ ← PKE.kg(1 k ). The security we require for PKE is IND-CCA security [30, 15] . To an adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) we associate the following experiment Exp cca PKE,A (k).
Experiment Exp
The adversary A 2 is restricted not to query PKE.Dec(sk , ·) with C * pke . We define the advantage of A in the experiment as For integers k, t, Q we also define
where the maximum is over all A that fulfill t A ≤ t and Q A ≤ Q.
Key Encapsulation Mechanisms
A key-encapsulation mechanism KEM = (KEM.Kg, KEM.Enc, KEM.Dec) with key-space K(k)
consists of three polynomial-time algorithms (PTAs). Via (pk , sk ) $ ← KEM.Kg(1 k ) the randomized key-generation algorithm produces public/secret keys for security parameter k ∈ N; via (K, C) $ ← KEM.Enc(pk ) the randomized encapsulation algorithm creates a uniformly distributed symmetric key K ∈ K(k) together with a ciphertext C; via K ← KEM.Dec(sk , C) the possessor of secret key sk decrypts ciphertext C to get back a key K which is an element in K or a special reject symbol ⊥. For consistency, we require that for all k ∈ N, and all (K, C) $ ← KEM.Enc(pk ) we have Pr [ KEM.Dec(sk , C) = K ] = 1, where the probability is taken over the choice of (pk , sk ) $ ← KEM.Kg(1 k ), and the coins of all the algorithms in the expression above. Here we only consider only KEMs that produce perfectly uniformly distributed keys (i.e., we require that for all public keys pk that can be output by KEM.Kg, the first component of KEM.Enc(pk ) has uniform distribution). 3 The common requirement for a KEM is indistinguishability against chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA) [14] where an adversary is allowed to adaptively query a decapsulation oracle with ciphertexts to obtain the corresponding key. We will not give the formal definition of IND-CCA for KEMs. Instead we refer the reader to Section 3 where we introduce a new, weaker security notion for KEMs that is sufficient for our goal of constructing IND-CCA secure hybrid encryption.
Authenticated Encryption
An authenticated symmetric encryption (AE) scheme AE = (AE.Enc, AE.Dec) is specified by its encryption algorithm AE.Enc (encrypting M ∈ MsgSp(k) with keys K ∈ K(k)) and decryption algorithm AE.Dec (returning M ∈ MsgSp(k) or ⊥). Here we restrict ourselves to deterministic PTAs AE.Enc and AE.Dec. The AE scheme needs to provide privacy (indistinguishability against one-time attacks) and authenticity (ciphertext authenticity against one-time attacks). This is simulataneously captured (similar to the more-time attack case [32] ) by defining the ae-otadvantage of an adversary B ae
, and B ae is allowed only one query to this leftor-right encryption oracle (one-time attack), with a pair of equal-length messages. Furthermore, the decrypt-or-reject oracle DoR 1 (ψ) returns M ← AE.Dec(K, ψ) and DoR 0 (ψ) always returns ⊥ (reject), B ae is allowed only one query to this decrypt-or-reject oracle which must be different from the output of the left-or-right oracle. (k) , where the maximum is over all B ae that fulfill t Bae ≤ t.
3 Hybrid encryption from Constrained CCA secure KEMs
Constrained Chosen-Ciphertext Security for KEMs
The common requirement for a KEM is security against chosen-ciphertext attacks [14] where an adversary is allowed to adaptively query a decapsulation oracle with ciphertexts to obtain the corresponding key. We relax this notion to contrained chosen-ciphertext security. Intuitively, we only allow the adversary to make a decapsulation query if it already has some "a priori knowledge" about the decapsulated key. This partial knowledge about the key is modeled implicitly by letting the adversary additionally provide an efficiently computable Boolean predicate pred : K → {0, 1}. If pred(K) = 1 then the decapsulated key K is returned, and ⊥ otherwise. The amount of uncertainty the adversary has about the key (denoted as "plaintext uncertainty" where for KEMs the plaintext is the symmetric key) is measured by the fraction of keys the pedicate evaluates to 1. We require this fraction to be negligible, i.e. the adversary has to have a high a priori knowledge about the decapsulated key when making a decapsulation query.
We now turn to a more formal definition. To an adversary A we associate the following experiment Exp
with the restriction that A is only allowed to query CDec(pred i , C i ) on predicates pred i that are provided as PTA 4 and on ciphertexts C i different from the challenge ciphertext C * . We define the advantage of A in the experiment as
For an adversary A, let t A denote the number of computational steps A runs (that includes the maximal time to evaluate each pred i once), and let Q A be the number of decapsulation queries A makes to its decapsulation oracle. For simplicity and without losing on generality, we consider only adversaries for which t A and Q A are independent of the environment that A runs in. To adversary A in the above experiment we also associate A's (implicit) plaintext uncertainty uncert A (k) when making decapsulation queries. Informally, uncert A (k) measures the average fraction of keys that a predicate pred i accepts, when running in environments that are at least as efficient as the original CCCA experiment. 5 Formally, for an adversary A and an environment E that A interacts with (e.g., E could be the original CCCA experiment that interacts with A), define
where pred i : K → {0, 1} is the predicate A submits in the ith decapsulation query. A CCCA adversary A is called valid, iff
• A is PTA, and
• for all environments E satisfying t E ≤ t CCCA , we have that uncert A,E (k) is negligible in k. Here, t CCCA denotes the runtime of the original CCCA experiment (not counting the adversary runtime and the runtime taken for evaluating predicates).
Finally, a key encapsulation mechanism KEM is said to be indistinguishable against con- Concrete security. In the following, we will be interested in a concrete security treatment. That is, we want not only an asymptotic security statement from an asymptotic computational assumpion; we also want a statement that shows exactly how much security one gets from a given non-asymptotic version of the assumption.
First, the notion of a valid adversary is asymptotic and thus doesn't make sense in a concrete treatment. We refine the central notion of uncert(·) therefore as follows:
where as before, t CCCA denotes the runtime of the original IND-CCCA experiment. Note that we take the maximum of this average probability over all environments that are at least as efficient as the original IND-CCCA experiment. Now the non-asymptotic, concrete version of CCCA security can be captured as follows: for integers k, t, Q, and for 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1, let
We also stress the following: demanding that Adv ccca KEM ,t,Q,µ (k) be negligible for all polynomials t, Q, and all negligible functions µ is not the same as demanding CCCA security. Namely, the former is the non-uniform version of CCCA security. (That is, CCCA security against adversaries that are non-uniform, polynomial-sized circuit families.) This is not an artifact of our definition, but a general phenomenon of definitions geared towards capturing concrete security. In any case, all our reductions below consist of uniform reductions, so what we show is in fact both uniform and non-uniform security.
An alternative formulation of CCCA security. We remark that it is possible to restrict the CDec(·, ·) oracle in the CCCA experiment to only output pred i (K) ∈ {0, 1} (and not the key itself in case pred i (K) = 1). Note that this does not restrict the adversary since in case pred i (K) = 1 it is always possible to reconstruct the whole key K by making |K(k)| = poly(k) additional CCCA decapsulation queries with the predicates pred i,
This determines the key K bit-wise.
Hybrid Encryption
Let KEM = (KEM.Kg, KEM.Enc, KEM.Dec) be a KEM and let AE = (AE.Enc, AE.Dec) be an authenticated encryption scheme. We assume that the two schemes are compatible in the sense that for all security parameters k, we have that the KEM's and the AE's key-space are equal. Then we can consider a hybrid public key encryption scheme that encrypts arbitrary messages M ∈ MsgSp. The construction of PKE = (PKE.kg, PKE.Enc, PKE.Dec) is as follows.
Here PKE.Dec returns ⊥ if either KEM.Dec or AE.Dec returns ⊥.
The following shows that a IND-CCCA secure KEM and a AE-OT secure authenticated encryption scheme yields a IND-CCA secure PKE scheme. Theorem 3.1 Assume KEM is secure in the sense of IND-CCCA and AE is secure in the sense of AE-OT. Then PKE is secure in the sense of IND-CCA. In particular,
where t ′ := t + t CCCA for the runtime t CCCA of the original IND-CCCA experiment.
The intuition of the proof is quite simple. The standard composition theorem [14] shows that in the above construction a IND-CCA secure KEM can be combined with a CCA secure DEM.
Here we only require the KEM to be IND-CCCA secure. We deal with the full CCA decryption queries in the hybrid PKE scheme as follows. A decryption query of an adversary in the IND-CCA game consists of a KEM ciphertext C plus a DEM ciphertext ψ. In the reduction we use the predicate pred ψ (·) defined as pred ψ (K) = 0 if AE.Dec(K, ψ) returns ⊥ and pred ψ (K) = 1 otherwise. (That is, ψ is hard-coded into pred ψ .) By the ciphertext authenticity property of AE this predicate has small plaintext uncertainty, i.e. uncert(k) ≤ 2Adv
ae-ot AE,B (k). On the other hand, this hybrid decryption query can be correctly simulated using the output from the CCCA decapsulation query (which is a symmetric key or ⊥) since an inconsistent ψ (with respect to the symmetric key) will already lead the predicate pred ψ (·) to be zero and hence the CCCA decapsulation query correctly returns reject. For a consistent ψ the predicate evaluates to one and the CCCA decapsulation query returns the correct symmetric key that in turn can be used to obtain the message from ψ.
We now give a formal proof of Theorem 3.1.
Proof: Let A be an adversary on the IND-CCA security of the hybrid scheme. We will consider a sequence of games, Game 1, Game 2, . . . , each game involving A. Let X i be the event that in Game i, it holds that b = b ′ , i.e., that the adversary succeeds. We will make use of the following simple "Difference Lemma" [14] .
Lemma 3.2 Let X 1 ,X 2 , B be events, and suppose that
Game 1. The original PKE IND-CCA game, i.e. we have
Game 2. Let C * pke = (C * , ψ * ) be the challenge ciphertext in the PKE IND-CCA game. In this game the decryption oracle in the first phase rejects all ciphertexts of the form C pke = (C * , * ). The view of adversary A is identical in Games 1 and 2 until a decryption query (C * , * ) is made in the first phase of the IND-CCA experiment (so before A gets to see C * ).
Since the key K encapsulated in C * is uniformly distributed and independent of A's view in the first phase, we have
Note that each ciphertext uniquely determines a key.
Game 3. Replace the symmetric key K * used to create the PKE challenge ciphertext with a random key K * , uniformly independently chosen from K. The proof of the following key lemma is postponed until later.
Game 4. Reject all ciphertexts C pke of the form (C * , * ). Since ψ * was generated using a random key K * ∈ K that only leaks to A through ψ * , authenticity of AE implies
for a suitable adversary B ae that simulates Game 3, using the LoR b with two identical messages to obtain the AE part of the challenge ciphertext. B ae simply uniformly picks one AE part of a decryption query of the form (C * , ψ) to submit to the decrypt-or-reject oracle DoR 1 (·).
Finally, Game 4 models one-time security of the AE scheme, and we have
Collecting the probabilities proves the theorem.
It leaves to prove Lemma 3.3.
Proof of Lemma 3.3:
We show that there exists an adversary B kem against the IND-CCCA security of KEM with t B kem = t A , Q B kem = Q A , and for every PTA environment E there is an adversary B ae against AE with t Bae = t A + t E , such that
The adversary B kem against the CCCA security of KEM is defined as follows. B kem inputs (pk , K * b , C * ) for an unknown bit b. First, B kem runs A 1 on input pk . For the ith decryption query (C i , ψ i ) made by adversary A 1 , adversary B kem defines the function pred i : K → {0, 1} as
Note that the symmetric ciphertext ψ i is hard-coded into pred i (·). Clearly, pred i (·) is efficiently computable. If C i = C * then B returns ⊥. Otherwise, B kem queries (pred i , C i ) to its own oracle CDec(·, ·) and receives the following answer:
Note that by the syntax of AE this can be used to perfectly simulate A's decryption queries.
For A's encryption challenge for two messages M 0 , M 1 , B kem uses its own input (K * b , C * ) together with a random bit δ to create a challenge ciphertext
, answering decryption queries as defined above with the difference that all decryption queries of the form (C * , ψ) (with ψ = ψ * ) are answered with withever AE.Dec(K * b , ψ) returns (a message or ⊥). Evntually, A 2 returns a guess bit δ ′ for δ and B kem concludes its game with outputting b ′ = 1 if δ = δ ′ and b ′ = 0, otherwise. This completes the description of B kem .
Adversary B kem always perfectly simulates A's decapsulation queries. In case b = 1, B kem uses the real key K * 1 for A's simulation which implies Equation (2) . In case b = 0, B kem uses a random key K * 0 for A's simulation which implies Equation (3). The complexity bounds for B kem are clear from the construction, and it is left to show that for any given efficient environment E, uncert B kem (k) = 2Adv ae-ot AE,Bae (k) for a suitable B ae .
To this end we build an adversary B ae against the AE security of AE as follows. B ae inputs 1 k and internally simulates an interaction between A and E completely faithfully. However, B ae additionally picks a random index j * ∈ {1, . . . , Q}. On A's j * decryption query (C j * , ψ j * ), B ae submits ψ j * to its own decryption-or-reject oracle DoR b (·), and outputs b ′ = 0 iff DoR b (·) rejects with ⊥. Now B ae will always output b ′ = 0 if b = 0 by definition of DoR 0 . In case b = 1, B ae will output b ′ = 1 iff the ciphertext ψ j * is valid in the sense AE.Dec(K ′ , ψ j * ) = ⊥ for an independent, uniformly (by the AE experiment) chosen key K ′ . So adversary B ae 's advantage is as follows.
where pred j * (·) = AE.Dec(·, ψ j * ) is the predicate adversary B kem submits to oracle CDec as the j * th query.
Efficient Key Encapsulation from DDH 4.1 Building blocks
We describe the building blocks used and assumptions made about them.
Group schemes. A group scheme GS [14] specifies a sequence (GR k ) k∈N of group descriptions. For every value of a security parameter k ∈ N, GR k specifies the four tuple
for notational convenience we sometimes drop the index k). GR k = (Ĝ, G, p, g) specifies a finite abelian groupĜ, along with a prime-order subgroup G, a generator g of G, and the order p of G. We denote the identity element of G as 1 G ∈ G. We assume thatĜ is of order q = p ′ p and that it takes |q| bits to represent an element in G. We further assume the existence of an efficient sampling algorithm x $ ← G and an efficient membership algorithm that test if a given element x ∈Ĝ is contained in the subgroup G.
We further assume the DDH problem is hard in GS, captured by defining the ddh-advantage of an adversary B ddh as
where g, h, K
We need an abstract notion of algebraic authenticated encryption where the keyspace consists of G, secure in the sense of OT-AE. In Appendix D we recall (following the encrypt-then-mac approach [5, 14] ) how to build such algebraic AE satisfying all required functionality and security from the following basic primitives:
• A (computationally secure) one-time symmetric encryption scheme with binary k-bit keys (such as AES or padding with a PRNG) • A (computationally secure) MAC (existentially unforgeable) with k-bit keys • A (computationally secure) key-derivation function (pseudorandom). We remark that for our purposes it is also possible to use a more efficient single-pass authenticated encryption scheme (see, e.g., [31] ). In both cases the the ciphertext expansion (i.e., ciphertext size minus plaintext size) of the AE scheme is only k (security parameter) bits which is optimal with respect to our security notion.
Target Collision Resistant Hashing. TCR = (TCR k ) k∈N is a family of keyed hash functions TCR s k : G → Z p for each k-bit key s. It is assumed to be target collision resistant (TCR) [14] , which is captured by defining the tcr-advantage of an adversary B tcr as
Note TCR is a weaker requirement than collision-resistance, so that, in particular, any practical collision-resistant function can be used. Also note that our notion of TCR is related to the stronger notion of universal one-way hashing [25] , where in the security experiment of the latter the target value c * is chosen by the adversary (but before seeing the hash key s).
Commonly [14, 24] this function is implemented using a dedicated cryptographic hash function like MD5 or SHA, which we assume to be target collision resistant. Since |G| = |Z p | = p we can alternatively also use a fixed (non-keyed) bijective encoding function INJ : G → Z p . In that case we have a perfectly collision resistant hash function, i.e. Adv 
The key-encapsulation mechanism
Let GS be a group scheme where GR k specifies (Ĝ, G, g, p) and let TCR : G → Z p be a target collision resistant hash function (for simplicity we assume TCR to be non-keyed). We build a key encapsulation mechanism KEM = (KEM.kg, KEM.Enc, KEM.Dec) with K = G as follows.
We stress that decryption never explicitly checks if π ∈ G; this check happens implicitly when c ∈ G and c xt+y = π is checked. A correctly generated ciphertext has the form C = (c, π) ∈ G × G, where c = g r and π = (u t v) r = (g xt+y ) r = c xt+y . Hence decapsulation will not reject and compute the key K = c ω = h r , as in encapsulation.
Encryption takes four standard exponentiations plus one application of TCR, where the generation of π can also be carried out as a single multi-exponentiation [7] . Decryption takes two exponentiations plus one application of TCR, where the two exponentiations can also be viewed as one sequential exponentiation [7] (which is as efficient as a multi-exponentiation) to simultaneously compute c xt+y and c ω .
Theorem 4.1 Let GS be a group scheme where the DDH problem is hard and assume TCR is target collision resistant. Then KEM is secure in the sense of IND-CCCA. In particular,
In combination with Theorem 3.1 we obtain the following concrete security result.
Corollary 4.2
The hybrid encryption scheme PKE obtained by combining KEM with authenticated encryption AE is secure in the sense of IND-CCA. In particular,
Before we give a formal proof we give some intuition why the KEM is IND-CCCA secure. The difficulty with the simulation is that an adversary against the DDH assumption (simulating an adversary's view) has to distinguish between consistent ciphertexts (i.e., ciphertexts for that c xt+y = π holds) and inconsistent ciphertexts, without knowing the secret key. The idea of the proof is as follows. The simulator inputs (g, h, c * = g r , K * ) and wants to distinguish K * = h r from a random element in G. In the simulation the values u, v from the public-key are setup such that the tuple (c * , π * ) can be used as the challenge ciphertext (for some efficiently computable π * ) and the value K * as the session key. By construction, the corresponding real session key is h r so breaking IND of the KEM is equivalent to solving the DDH problem. It leaves to deal with the decapsulation queries under a CCCA attack. The simulator is not able to distinguish consistent from inconsistent ciphertexts. However, the simualor uses an alternative decapsulation algorithm with the following two properties:
• If the queried ciphertext is consistent (and as long as it is distinct from the challenge ciphertext) then the alternative decapsulation algorithm yields the correct session key K. This is done using an algebraic trick from selective-ID secure identity-based encryption [8] .
• If the queried ciphertext is inconsistent then the alternative decapsulation algorithm yields one virtual session key K that is uniformly distributed over G (in an information theoretic sense). The probability space is taken over all possible secret keys of the simulator that yield the public-key given to the adversary. Returning the virtual key K to the adversary would completely determine the simulator's secret key and hence also the virtual key K ′ for the next decapsulation query. However, in the IND-CCCA game it will be hard for an adversary to provide sufficient information about K (in form of the predicate pred) such that inconsistent decapsulation queries will nearly always lead to a rejection and the same argument can be repeated iteratively.
We now turn to a formal proof.
Proof: First, if a key pair (pk , sk ) with pk = (h, u, v) and sk = (ω, x, y) is clear from the context, we call a ciphertext C = (c, π) consistent iff c xt+y = π holds for the tag t := TCR(c). Note that C is hence consistent iff log g (c) = log u t v (π).
Let A be an adversary on the IND-CCCA security of the KEM. We will consider a sequence of games, Game 1, Game 2, . . . , each game involving A. Let X i be the event that in Game i, it holds that b = b ′ , i.e., that the adversary succeeds.
Game 1. The KEM IND-CCCA game with random b ∈ {0, 1}, i.e., we have
Let us fix some notation. Let C * = (c * , π * ) = (g a , (u t * v) a ) be the challenge ciphertext (where t * = TCR(c * )) and let K * 1 = h a be the real challenge key.
Game 2. The decryption oracle immediately rejects all ciphertexts (c, π) with c = c * and t = t * (TCR check). Since Game 1 and Game 2 proceed identically until c = c * and TCR(c) = t = t * = TCR(c * ), we have Lemma 3.2
Game 3. Change generation of the secret key as follows. Pick uniformly values x 1 , x 2 , y 1 ∈ Z p with x 2 = 0 and define
Note that public and secret key have exactly the same distribution as in the last game.
We will now rewrite the experiment in terms of x 1 , x 2 , and y 1 (our goal is to run the experiment without knowledge of ω). Equation (4) defines the public key as
Note that now the consistency check c xt+y = π needs to know ω. The change of the secret key also implicitly affects the generation of the element π * in the challenge ciphertext.
Creation of challenge ciphertext C * and real key K * 1 now simplifies to
Hence (c * , π * ) is a correctly generated ciphertext for the real key K * 1 with randomness a ∈ Z p since by Equations (4) and (5) we have (u t * v) a = (g x 1 t * +y 1 h x 2 (t * −t * ) ) a = (g a ) x 1 t * +y 1 = π * . Note that the experiment does not explicitly know the randomness a, only the values g a and h a . Since the changes are purely conceptual we have
Game 4. Consider a query (pred, C) adversary A makes to the oracle CDec(·, ·) and recall that pred : G → {0, 1} is some efficiently computable predicate. After the TCR check, such a query is now processed in the following way. If the ciphertext C is inconsistent (this is checked using ω) it gets rejected. If the ciphertext C = (c, π) is consistent (by C = C * at this point we have t = t * ) compute K as
If pred(K) = 0, then reject, and return K otherwise.
This change is purely conceptual since for any consistent ciphertext with t = t * we have π = (u t v) r = (g x 1 t+y 1 h x 2 (t−t * ) ) r = c x 1 t+y 1 K x 2 (t−t * ) which implies correctness of Equation (7). Consequently,
Game 5. A query (pred, C) adversary A makes to the oracle CDec(·, ·) is now processed in the following way. After the TCR check, for all ciphertexts C = (c, π) (consistent and inconsistent alike) the key K is decapsulated using Equation (7). If pred(K) = 0, then reject, and return K otherwise.
Note that at this point the experiment does not make use of ω = log g h anymore and hence the value h ∈ G from the public key can be generated as a random group element. The proof of the following key lemma will be given later.
Intuitively the lemma holds since for one inconsistent ciphertext submitted to the CDec(·, ·) oracle, the virtual key K computed as in Equation (7) looks like a uniform and undependent element in the view of the adversary (the probability space is the redundancy contained in sk that is information-theoretically hidden from pk ). But for a random independent key K, the probability that pred(K) = 1 (meaning the ciphertext does not get rejected) is bounded by uncert A (k) which is negligible by assumption. Hence, with high probability the inconsistent ciphertext gets rejected and the virtual key K remains hidden from the adversary's view. This makes it possible to use a hybrid argument to show that, with high probability, all inconsistent ciphertexts get rejected in Game 5, just as in Game 4.
Game 6. The real challenge key K * 1 is replaced by the random key K * 0 ∈ G. Since in Game 5 we had K * 1 = h a and apart from that the experiment was run using the values g, h, g a only (where all three elements are random group elements), we have
(Note that K * 1 is only used for b = 1, which occurs with probability 1/2.) Finally, in Game 6 the distribution of the challenge key K * 0 does not depend on b, and consequently Pr[X 6 ] = 1/2 .
It leaves to prove Lemma 4.3.
Proof: For j ∈ {1, . . . , Q}, let E j denote the event that in Game 4, adversary A submits as j-th decryption query a ciphertext (C j , pred j ) that gets rejected, but would not have been rejected in Game 5. Let E := E 1 ∨ . . . ∨ E Q . Analogously, let F denote the event that in Game 5, adversary A submits at any point a decapsulation query that does not get rejected, but would have been rejected in Game 4. Games 4 and 5 proceed identical unless a decapsulation query gets treated differently. Consequently,
Now consider eventsÊ j , where for j ∈ {1, . . . , Q}, eventÊ j denotes that the j-th decryption query (C j , pred j ) in Game 4 gets rejected, but pred j (K ′ ) = 1 under an independently uniformly
since Game 4 has the same complexity as the original IND-CCCA experiment. 6 We now claim that for all j:
This implies
Combining this with (8) and using Lemma 3.2 proves the lemma.
It leaves to prove Equation (9) . Fix a security parameter k and j ∈ {1, . . . , Q(k)}. Let C = (c, π) be the ciphertext of the j-th decryption query in Game 4.
Let t := TCR(c), r := log g c, and β := log g π. Write furthermore ω = log g h, and x = log g u = x 1 + ωx 2 , y = log g v = y 1 − t * ωx 2 as before. Then (c, π) is consistent iff π = (u t v) r , or, alternatively, iff β = r · (tx + y). Furthermore, if (c, π) is consistent, then E j andÊ j cannot be fulfilled by definition. However, we claim that under the condition that (c, π) is inconsistent, the "virtual key" K used to determine whether pred(K) = 1 or not (according to the rules of 6 There is some "fuzziness" here; depending on the used complexity model, Game 4 might have a complexity which is only roughly that of the IND-CCCA game. Formally, a concrete security analysis requires in that case that adversaries be also "valid when run in slightly more complex environments than the IND-CCCA game." We stress that such an extension to our theory is possible, in fact straightforward, and in particular yields the results one would expect. However, such an extension also requires a more complex set of definitions. In the interest of a clear presentation, we stick to the usual but formally non-rigorous convention that slight changes to a security game do not add to its complexity. Game 5) is, just as the key K ′ of eventÊ j , uniformly distributed and independent of the choice of the predicate pred. So assume β = r · (tx + y). For the key K from Game 5, it holds that
Define the mapping F through
By the assumptions β − r · (tx + y) = 0 and t − t * = 0, this mapping is well-defined and bijective and only depends on information known (in an information-theoretic sense) to the adversary. Hence, to show that, from A's perspective, K is (almost) uniformly distributed, it suffices to show that F (log g K) = 1/x 2 mod p is (almost) uniformly distributed given a public key. But a public key determines only x = x 1 + ωx 2 and y = y 1 − t * ωx 2 . Hence, x 2 (and consequently 1/x 2 ) is still uniformly and independently from A's view distributed over {1, . . . , p − 1}. This
Comparison with Cramer-Shoup and Kurosawa-Desmedt
The following table summarizes the key-encapsulation part of the (only IND-CPA secure) ElGamal scheme [16] , the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme [14] , the Kurosawa-Desmedt scheme [24] , and ours.
Hereĝ is another element from the public-key. Compared to the Cramer-Shoup scheme, the Kurosawa-Desmedt scheme leaves out the value h r and defines (u t v) r out the encapsulated key. Our results shows that it is also possible to leave out the elementĝ r from the ciphertext and that π = (u t v) r is sufficient to authenticate c = g r . Hence, our scheme can be viewed as the dual of (the KEM part of) the Kurosawa-Desmedt scheme. From another point of view, compared to the IND-CPA secure ElGamal scheme our scheme adds one group element π = (u t v) r to the KEM ciphertext which is sufficient to prove it IND-CCCA secure under the DDH assumption. From a technical point of view, our scheme mixes Cramer-Shoup like techniques [13] to obtain a form of "plaintext awareness" for inconsistent ciphertexts with an "algebraic trick" from the Boneh-Boyen identity-based encryption scheme [8] to decrypt consistent ciphertexts. Compared to Cramer-Shoup based proofs [12, 14, 24, 2] the most important technical difference, caused by the mentioned ability to decrypt consistent ciphertexts without knowing the full secret key, is that during our simulation the challenge ciphertexts is never made inconsistent. Intuitively this is the reason why we manage to maintain a consistent simulation using less redundancy in the secret key. This demonstrates that IND-CCCA security can be obtained with constructions that inherently differ from hash proof systems.
On the other hand, the security proofs of all schemes based on IBE-techniques [11, 10, 22, 23, 21] inherently relies on some sort of external consistency check for the ciphertexts. This can be seen as the main reason why security of the IBE-based PKE schemes could only be proved in pairing groups (or relative to a gap-assumption), where the pairing was neccessary for helping the proof identifying inconsistent ciphertexts. In our setting, the consistency check is done implicitly, using information-theoretic arguments borrowed from hash proof systems.
Explicit vs. implicit rejection
The scheme is given in its explicit-rejction variant, i.e. all inconsistent ciphertexts get immediately rejected by the decapsulation algorithm. Following [14] we can also give an implicitrejection variant of the scheme, where inconsistent ciphertexts yield one uniform key and hence will be rejected by the authenticity property of the DEM. Details are given in Appendix A. The specific structure of the implicit-rejection KEM makes it possible to share the public elements g and h among many parties since decryption does not depend on the knowledge of ω = log g (h) anymore. Hence, similar to the Cramer-Shoup scheme, this implicit-rejection scheme can be used in the setting of multi-recipient encryption [3] , where one single message is being simultaneously sent to a set of n different recipients.
A hash-free variant
Similar to [14] we can also give a hash-free variant of our scheme that abandons the hash function TCR : G → Z p . This variant is useful when neither a bijective encoding nor a targetcolission resistant hash function TCR is available. In terms of computational efficiency and size of public/secret keys the hash-free variant is slightly less efficient but security can be proved relying solely on the DDH assumption. Details are given in Appendix B.
Efficiency
We compare our new DDH-based scheme's efficiency with the one of Kurosawa and Desmedt (in its more efficient "explicit-rejection" variant from [29] ). Most importantly, the number of exponentiations for encryption and decryption are equal in both schemes. Although our security result is much more general (our KEM can be combined with any authenticated encryption scheme) this is not an exclusive advantage of our scheme. In fact we can derive the same result for the KD scheme from a more general theorem that we will prove in Section 6. (A similar result about combining the Kurosawa-Desmedt scheme with authenticated encryption was already obtained in [4] in the context of statefull encryption.) However, there is one crucial difference in case one needs a scheme that is provably secure solely on the DDH assumption. Note that security (of the KD scheme and ours) relies on the DDH assumption and the assumption that TCR is target collision resistant. So as long as one does not want to sacrifice provable security by implementing the TCR function with a dedicated hash function like SHA-x or MD5 (what potentially renders the whole scheme insecure given the recent progress in attacking certain hash functions [38, 39] ), one must either resort to inefficient generic constructions of TCR functions [25, 33] , or one can use the "hash-free technique" described in [14] . With this latter technique, one can get rid of the TCR function completely; however, this comes at the cost of additional elements in the public and the secret key, and additional exponentiations during encryption. This overhead is linear in the number of elements that would have been hashed with the TCR. In the Kurosawa-Desmedt scheme, TCR acts on two group elements whereas in our scheme only on one. Hence the hash-free variant of our scheme is more efficient.
More importantly, since in our scheme a TCR is employed which maps one group element to integers modulo the group-order this can also be a bijection. In many concrete groups, e.g., when using the subgroup of quadratic residues modulo a safe prime or certain elliptic curves, this bijection can be trivially implemented at zero cost [14, 10] , without any additional computational assumption, and without sacrificing provable security. See Appendix C for more details. In terms of efficiency we view this as the main benefit of our scheme.
Key Encapsulation from n-Linear
Linear Assumptions
Let n = n(k) be a polynomial in k. Generalizing [9, 21] we introduce the class of n-Linear assumptions which can be seen as a natural generalization of the DDH assumption and the Linear assumption.
Let GS be a group scheme. We define the n-lin-advantage of an adversary B n-lin as
where g 1 , . . . , g n , h, K $ ← G and all r i ← Z * p . We say that the n-Linear Decisional Diffie-Hellman (n-Linear) assumption relative to group scheme GS holds if Adv n-lin GS,B n-lin is a negligible function in k for all polynomial-time adversaries B n-lin .
The n-Linear assumptions form a strict hierarchy of security assumptions with 1-Linear = DDH, 2-Linear=Linear [9] and, the larger the n, the weaker the n-Linear assumption. More precisely, for any n ≥ 1 we have that n-Linear implies n+1-Linear. On the other hand (extending the case of n = 1 [9] ) we can show that in the generic group model [35] , the n+1-Linear assumption holds, even relative to an n-Linear oracle.
The key-encapsulation mechanism
Let GS be a group scheme where GR k specifies (Ĝ, G, g, p) and let TCR : G n+1 → Z p be a target collision resistant hash function. Generalizing the Kurosawa-Desmedt KEM, for a parameter n = n(k) ≥ 1, we build KEM = (KEM.Kg, KEM.Enc, KEM.Dec) as follows.
Key generation KEM.Kg(1 k ) generates random group elements g 1 , . . . , g n , h ∈ G. Furthermore, it defines u j = g x j j h z and v j = g y j j h z ′ for random z, z ′ ∈ Z p and x j , y j ∈ Z p (j ∈ {1, . . . , n}). The public key contains the elements h, (g j , u j ) 1≤i≤n , and the secret key contains all corresponding indices.
KEM.Enc(pk )
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n}: r j
Ciphertexts contain n + 1 group elements, public/secret keys 2n + 1 elements. The scheme instantiated with n = 1 precisely reproduces the KEM part of the Kurosawa-Desmedt encryption scheme [24] . We remark that the scheme is presented in its implicit-rejection variant. It is also possible to give a variant that explicitly rejects inconsistent ciphertexts.
Security of the schemes can be explained using the more general framework of computational hash-proof systems. This will be done in Section 6. Theorem 5.2 Let GS be a group scheme where the n-Linear problem is hard, assume TCR is target collision resistant. Then KEM is secure in the sense of IND-CCCA.
The Dual Key Encapsulation Mechanism
Let GS be a group scheme where GR k specifies (Ĝ, G, g, p) and let TCR : G n → Z p be a target collision resistant hash function. Generalizing our scheme from Section 4 for a parameter n = n(k) ≥ 1, we build KEM = (KEM.Kg, KEM.Enc, KEM.Dec) as follows.
Key generation KEM.Kg(1 k ) generates random group elements g 1 , . . . , g n , h ∈ G and indices ω j such that h = g ω j j . Furthermore it defines u j = g x j j and v j = g y j j for random x j , y j ∈ Z p (j ∈ {1, . . . , n}). The public key contains the elements h, (g j , u j , v j ) 1≤i≤n , and the secret key contains all corresponding indices.
Correctness of the scheme can be verified analogously to Section 4. Ciphertexts contain n + 1 group elements, public/secret keys 3n+1 elements. The scheme instantiated with n = 1 precisely reproduces our DDH-based dual KD-KEM from Section 4. Theorem 5.3 Let GS be a group scheme where the n-Linear problem is hard, assume TCR is target collision resistant. Then KEM is secure in the sense of IND-CCCA. In particular,
for a suitable environment E that roughly has the same complexity as the IND-CCCA experiment.
The proof of Theorem 5.3 is similar to the one of Theorem 4.1. We quickly sketch the simulation of the adversary's view. Given the values (g 1 , . . . , g n , c * 1 = g r 1 1 , . . . , c * n = g rn n , h, T ) from the n-Linear problem (where T = h r 1 +...+rn or random) the simulator picks random x 1 , . . . ,x n ,ỹ 1 , . . . ,ỹ n , z ∈ Z * p and defines the values (u i ) 1≤i≤n and (v i ) 1≤i≤n as
where t * = TCR(c * 1 , . . . , c * n ). Note that (in an information theoretic sense) through the public-key the adversary knows exactly 2n linear equations in the 2n + 1 variablesx 1 , . . . ,x n ,ỹ i , . . . ,ỹ n , z. The challenge ciphertext is defined as C * = (c * 1 , . . . , c * n , n i=1 c * ix i t * +ỹ i ) and the encapsulated key as T which is either the real key h r 1 +...+rn or a random key. For a CCCA decapsulation query (C, pred) the virtual key K is computed as
and K is only returned to the adversary if pred(K) = 1. As in the proof of Theorem 4.1 it can be verified that (i) if C is consistent then K is the correct key; (ii) if C is inconsistent then (from the adversary's view) K is a uniform random element in G and hence, with high probability, the query will be rejected by the predicate test.
Key encapsulation from Hash Proof Systems
In [13] Cramer and Shoup showed that their original scheme in [14] was a special instance of a generic framework based on hash proof systems (HPS). In this section we further elaborate on the usefulness of Constrained chosen-ciphertext secure KEMs by showing that they can be built from any hash-proof system.
Following [24] we recall the basic ideas and show how to build IND-CCCA secure key encapsulation based on a computational variant of hash proof systems. Here we use a slightly different notation that reflects our primary use of hash-proof systems as key-encapsulation mechanisms.
Hash proof systems
Let C, K be sets and V ⊂ C a language. Let D sk : C → K be a hash function indexed with sk ∈ S, where S is a set. A hash function D sk is projective if there exists a projection µ : S → P such that µ(sk ) ∈ P defines the action of D sk over the subset V. That is, for every C ∈ V, the value K = D sk (C) is uniquely determined by µ(sk ) and C. In contrast, nothing is guaranteed for C ∈ C \ V, and it may not be possible to compute D sk (C) from µ(sk ) and C. A strongly universal 2 projective hash function has the additional property that for C ∈ C \V, the projection key µ(sk ) actually says nothing about the value of K = D sk (C), even given an instance (C * , K * ) such that C * ∈ C \ V and K * = D sk (C). More precisely, for all pk ∈ P, C, all C * ∈ C \ V with
A hash proof system HPS = (HPS.param, HPS.pub, HPS.priv) consists of three algorithms.
The randomized algorithm HPS.param(1 k ) generates instances of params = (group, C, V, P, S, D (·) : C → K, µ : S → P), where group may contain some additional structural parameters. The deterministic public evaluation algorithm HPS.pub inputs the projection key pk = µ(sk ), C ∈ V and a witness w of the fact that C ∈ V and returns K = D sk (C). The deterministic private evaluation algorithm inputs sk ∈ S and returns D sk (C), without knowing a witness. We further assume there are efficient algorithms given for sampling sk ∈ S and sampling C ∈ V uniformly together with a witness w.
As computational problem we require that the subset membership problem is hard in HPS which means that the two elements C and C ′ are computationally indistinguishable, for random C ∈ V and random C ′ ∈ C \V. This is captured by defining the advantage function Adv
Key encapsulation from HPS
Using the above notion of a hash proof system, Kurosawa and Desmedt [24] proposed a hybrid encryption scheme which improved the schemes from [13] . The key-encapsulation part of it is as follows. The system parameters of the scheme consist of params
KEM.Kg(k). Choose random sk $ ← S and define pk = µ(sk ) ∈ P. Return (pk , sk ).
KEM.Dec(sk , C). Reconstruct the key K = D sk (C) as K ← HPS.priv(sk , C) and return K.
We can prove the following theorem that is a slight generalization of [24] . Unfortunately, the original KEM part of the Kurosawa Desmedt DDH-based hybrid encryption scheme [24] cannot be explained using this framework and hence needed a separate proof of security. This is since the underlying DDH-based hash proof system involves a target collision resistant hash function TCR which is a "computational primitive" whereas the strongly universal 2 property from Equation (10) is a statistical property which is in particular not fulfilled by the DDH-based HPS from [13] used in [24] . In fact, the most efficient HPS-based schemes that are known involve computation of a TCR function and hence all need a separate proof of security. We note that this problem is inherited from the original HPS approach [14] .
We overcome this problem we defining the weaker notion of computational hash proof systems.
Computational hash proof systems
We now define a weaker computational variant of strongly universal 2 hashing. To an adversary B we associate the following experiment Exp
where the evaluation oracle EvalD(C) returns K = D sk (C) if C ∈ V and ⊥, otherwise. We also restrict to adversaries that only return ciphertexts C = C * and that ensure C ∈ C \ V. This is without losing generality, since B 1 can check C ∈ V with its oracle EvalD. We define the advantage of B in the experiment as A hash proof system HPS is said to be computationally universal 2 (CU 2 ) if for all polynomialtime adversaries B that satisfy these requirements, the advantage function Adv
HPS,B (k) is a negligible function in k.
The following theorem strengthens Theorem 6.1. 
HPS,t (k)).
Proof: Let A be an adversary on the IND-CCCA security of the KEM. We will consider a sequence of games, Game 1, Game 2, . . . , each game involving A. Let X i be the event that in Game i, it holds that b = b ′ , i.e., that the adversary succeeds.
As this point we can assume that the real key K * 1 is computed as K * 1 = D sk (C * ) for a uniformly chosen C * $ ← V whereas the random key K * 0 is computed as Let E j be the event that C j ∈ C \ V but pred j (K j ) = 1, and define
and E = − → E Q . Since unless E happens, the Games 2 and 3 proceed indentically, we have
We now upper bound Pr [E] . LetÊ j be the event that C j ∈ C \ V but pred j (K ′ ) = 1 for an independently uniformly chosen key K ′ ∈ K.
To do so, we define the following adversary B = (B 1 , B 2 ) against CU 2 of HPS. Adversary B 1 inputs (pk , C * 1 , K * 1 ) and first uniformly chooses j * ∈ {1, . . . , Q}. It then provides A with (pk , C * 1 , K * 1 ). For 1 ≤ i ≤ j * − 1, adversary A's ith decapsulation query (pred i , C i ) is processed as follows. First B 1 calls EvalD(C i ) to obtain K i or ⊥. If the answer was ⊥ (which means that C i ∈ V) it returns ⊥ to A. Otherwise (C i ∈ V) B 1 defines K i ← EvalD(C i ) = KEM.Dec(sk , C i ) and returns K i if pred i (K i ) = 1 and ⊥, otherwise. Adversary A's j * -th decapsulation query (pred j * , C j * ) is processed as follows. If EvalD(C j * ) yields ⊥ (meaning C j * ∈ V) then B 1 terminates and lets B 2 return b ′ = 0. Otherwise, B 1 returns C j * to its own CU 2 experiment. Finally, B 2 inputs a challenge key K b and returns b ′ = pred j * (K b ) to its experiment and terminates.
We now analyze B's success probability. In analogy to the eventsÊ j , define events F j and F j . Here, F j denotes the probability that in the setting which B simulates for A (i.e., in a setting in which all A gets all queries C ∈ C \ V rejected), the j-th query C j is ∈ C \ V but pred j (K j ) = 1. Analogously,F j denotes the event that in this setting, C j is ∈ C \ V but pred j (K ′ j ) = 1 for a uniformly and independently chosen key 
In ( * ), we use not only the induction hypothesis, but also the fact that
for every j by definition of E j and F j . Similarly, we can show Pr[
We split Adv
and consider the two summands seperately. Now note that by definition of B, we have
since Game 2 has the same complexity as the original IND-CCCA game. 7 Summarizing, we obtain
Game 4. The real challenge key K * 1 is replaced by the random key K * 0 ∈ K. We have
HPS,t (k)
Finally, since in Game 4 the distribution of the challenge key K * 0 is independent of b we have Pr[X 4 ] = 1/2 .
A computational HPS from n-Linear
Let GS be a group scheme where GR k specifies (Ĝ, G, g, p). Let group = (GR, g 1 , . . . , g n , h), where g 1 , . . . , g n , h are independent generators of G. Define C = G n+1 and V = {(g
This defines HPS.priv(sk , C). Given pk = µ(sk ), C ∈ V and a witness w = (r 1 , .
Correctness follows by Equation (11) and the definition of µ. This completes the description of HPS. Clearly, under the n-Linear assumption, the subset membership problem is hard in HPS.
Obviously, the above defined HPS is not strongly universal 2 in the sense of Equation (10) . But it is still computationally universal 2 . Lemma 6.3 The n-Linear based HPS is computationally universal 2 .
Together with Theorem 6.2 this proves Theorem 5.2. For the case n = 1 this also gives an alternative security proof for the Kurosawa-Desmedt scheme [24] .
Proof: Consider an adversary B in the CU 2 experiment such that B 1 outputs a ciphertext C ∈ C \ V and let K ← D sk (C). Let col be the event that C = C * but TCR(C) = TCR(C * ). We claim that for the following adversary B tcr we have Adv tcr TCR,Btcr (k) = Pr [col] . Adversary B tcr inputs (s, C * ) and generates a random instance of params with known indices α i such that h = g α i . Furthermore, B tcr picks a random sk ∈ S and runs B 1 on pk = µ(sk ), a random C * ∈ C \ V, and K * = D sk (C * ). To answer a query to the evaluation oracle EvalD(·), B tcr fist verifies C = (c 1 , . . . , c n , d) ∈ V by checking if c
If for a decapsulation query C event col happens, B tcr returns C to its TCR experiment and terminates. Now we claim that conditioned under ¬col, the key K = D sk (C) is a uniform element in K independent of the adversary's view. This implies that not even a computationally unbounded Let log(·) = log g (·). Consider the view of B 2 consisting of the random variables (pk , C * , K * , C),
n , h r * ) with r * i = r * since C * ∈ C \ V, K * = D sk (C * ), and C = (c 1 , . . . , c n , d) = (g r 1 1 , . . . , g rn n , h r ) ( r i = r since C ∈ C \ V). From the system parameters g 1 , . . . , g n , h, adversary B 2 learns ω = log h, ω i = log g i , and from pk
From C * the adversary learns r * i = log g i c * i , r * = log h d * , and from K * (by Equation (11)) the value log
and t * = TCR(c * 1 , . . . , c * n , d * ). Furthermore, from C, B 2 learns r i = log g i c i and
with t = TCR(C) = t * , is a uniform and independent element in Z p . Consider the set of linear equations over the hidden values x 1 , . . . , x n , y 1 , . . . , y n , z, z ′ defined by Equations (12), (13) (14) is linearly independent of (12) and (13).
A computational HPS based on Paillier
For a reader familiar with this concept we briefly sketch a computational hash-proof system based on Paillier's Decision Composite Residuosity (DCR) assumption [13] . For more details we refer the reader to [27, 13] . Let p 1 , q 1 , p 2 , q 2 be primes where p 1 = 2p 2 + 1 and q 1 = 2q 2 + 1.
can be uniquely written as
Let N 1 , g 2 be public parameters (that implicitly define the secret N 2 ). Define C = G and V = G N 2 . Let TCR : C → Z ⌊N 2 1 /2⌋ be a target collision resistant hash function. For a C = g r 2 ∈ V ⊂ C, the element r ∈ W ′ = {0, . . . , N 2 − 1} is a witness (for C ∈ V). Since N 2 is unknown, public sampling from the set V is done by picking random r ∈ W = {0, . . . , ⌊N 1 /4⌋} ≈ W ′ and computing C = g r 2 . Let K = {0, . . . , ⌊N 2 1 /2⌋} ≈ {0, . . . , N 1 N 2 − 1}. The set S is defined as S = {(x, y) : x, y ∈ K} and the projection µ : S → P as µ(sk ) = (u = g x 2 , v = g
1 ] 2 , where t = TCR(C). Given witness r ∈ W such that C = g r 2 ∈ V and (u, v) = µ(sk ), public evaluation
For correctness we refer to [13] . This completes the description of the hash-proof system HPS.
As shown in [13] , the subset membership problem is hard if the DCR assumption holds. Using the techniques from [13] it is now easy to show that if TCR is target collision resistant, then HPS is a computationally universal 2 .
Note that decryption has to ensure that both elements c, π are contained in G, whereas the explicit rejction scheme only has to check if c is contained in G. Further, the two generators g, h can be viewed as fixed over a multi-user PKI environment. That means that g, h can be put in the general system parameters and only u, v have to be distinct for each user.
Correctness can be verified as follows. Without loss of generality, assume (u t v) = 1. Let ω = log g h. For an arbitrary ciphertext (c, π) we have c = g r 1 and π = (u t v) r 2 = (g (−x 1 /y 2 )t−y 1 /y 2 h 1/y 2 ) r 2 = g r 2 ·
−(x 1 t+y 1 )+ω y 2
, where r 1 = r 2 iff the ciphertext was correctly generated. Decapsulation computes K as K = c x 1 t+y 1 · π y 2 = g r 1 (x 1 t+y 1 )+r 2 (−(x 1 t+y 1 )+ω) = h r 2 · g (r 1 −r 2 )(x 1 t+y 1 ) .
In case the ciphertext is consistent this reconstructs the correct key. In case the ciphertext is not consistent, decapsulation yields one uniform key K. However, in the IND-CCCA game it will be hard for an adversary to provide sufficient information (in form of a predicate) about K. Hence, informally speaking, inconsistent decapsulation queries are not useful.
A.1 Multi-user setting
The specific structure of the implicit-rejection KEM makes it possible to share the public elements g and h among many parties since decryption does not depend on the knowledge of ω = log g (h) anymore. Hence, similar to the Cramer-Shoup scheme, this implicit-rejection scheme can be used in the setting of multi-recipient encryption [3] , where one single message is being simultaneously sent to a set of n different recipients.
Here the global system parameters consist of the two group elements g, h and the individual public key of the ith recipient only consists of the two group elements (u i , v i ). To encrypt a message to n different recipient, the encapsulated symmetric key K = h r and the first element of the ciphertext c = g r can be shared among all recipients. Hence the multi-receiver ciphertext consists of c = g r , the symmetric part DEM.Enc K (M ) and the individual parts π i = (u t i v i ) r , for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Compared to the naive solution (applying n-times the hybrid encryption scheme) this saves n − 1 times the symmetric part (each contains m + k bits) plus n group elements.
B A hash-free variant of the dual KD scheme
Following [14] we give a hash-free variant KEM = (KEM.Kg, KEM.Enc, KEM.Dec) which can be used in case the dual KD KEM has to be implemented in groups where there is no efficient bijection TCR * : G → Z p known. The hash-free variant basically implements an injective encoding CHOP :Ĝ → Z ℓ p for a sufficiently large ℓ ≥ 1. In principle, such encodings always exist, since we can, similar to [14, 10] , always write down the p-adic representation of any encoding of element c ∈Ĝ. E.g., in caseĜ = Z q ′ and G ⊆ Z q ′ has prime-order p, one would have ℓ = ⌈log p (q ′ )⌉ = ⌈|q ′ |/|p|⌉. For all practical choices of p and q ′ we have q ′ ≤ p 2 (for example, all NIST recommended elliptic curves [26] ) and hence ℓ ≤ 2. Hence, CHOP can be implemented using "mod p" operations at negliglible cost (compared to one exponentiation). ← (u 1 , . . . , u ℓ , h ) ∈ G ℓ+1 sk ← (x 1 , . . . , x ℓ , ω) ∈ (Z p ) ℓ+1 Return (sk , pk ) KEM.Enc(pk ) r $ ← Z * p ; c ← g r (t 1 , . . . , t ℓ ) ← CHOP(c)
Parse C as (c, π) ∈Ĝ ×Ĝ if c ∈ G return ⊥ (t 1 , . . . , t ℓ ) ← CHOP(c) if c
Encryption takes ℓ+3 exponentiations, where the generation of π can again be viewed as a single multi-exponentiation (as long as ℓ is a small constant). Decryption takes two exponentiations which can be viewed as one sequential exponentiation. Public-key contains ℓ + 2 elements in G, secret-key ℓ + 2 element in Z p . Again, for most practical group schemes, ℓ = 2.
Comparison with Kurosawa-Desmedt. A corresponding hash-free variant of the KurosawaDesmedt scheme has key sizes |pk | = ℓ ′ + 2, |sk | = 2ℓ ′ , where ℓ ′ = ⌈2|q ′ |/|p|⌉ (due to the fact that CHOP has to map two group elements to Z ℓ ′ p ). Encryption has ℓ ′ + 3 exponentiations, decryption three. Assuming q ′ ≤ p 2 we get ℓ ′ ≤ 4.
C Target collision resistant hashing
In the description of the schemes, the target collision resistent hash function TCR maps elements from G to Z p . However, G is a subgroup ofĜ and hence elements from G are usually represented as elements fromĜ. Hence, what we need is a TCR function TCR :Ĝ → Z p that is target collision-resistant on G ⊆Ĝ.
In this section we show that for many interesting group schemes GS we can implement such hash functions very efficiently by exploiting the fact that the order of G equals p, i.e. by giving a function TCR * :Ĝ → Z p that is a bijection on G. As already pointed out in [10] we note that it is sufficient for our application that TCR * is injective on an overwhelming fraction of G. In case we can efficiently find out if a given element is "non-bijective" we define TCR + as follows. If the coordinates x and y are chosen from a large finite field F ℓ , the solutions form a finite abelian groupĜ = E(F ℓ ) with O, the distinguished point at infinity, playing the role of multiplicative identity. According to Hasse's theorem the number of points on a curve is close to the size of the underlying field; more precisely, ( √ ℓ − 1) 2 ≤ |E(F ℓ )| ≤ ( √ ℓ + 1) 2 . We consider the case where E(F ℓ ) already has prime order and set G =Ĝ = (F ℓ ). Then the mapping TCR + (x, y) = ⊥ : x ≥ ℓ x : otherwise
